In October 1981, Andreas Papandreou, founder and charismatic leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), brought the Socialists into power for the first time in Greece's postwar history. He was considered to be the man of change in all domains, including foreign policy. Papandreou preached a third world neutralist stance and his preelectoral speeches promised to readjust relations with the US, NATO and the EEC, of which Greece became full member that very year. This article examines the foreign policy of Papandreou regarding Mediterranean affairs from 1981 to 1986, principally from a European perspective. Opting for a global rather than a bilateral perspective allows us to better understand an essential aspect of Greek foreign attitudes at the time: their Europeanization. Moreover, from the point of view of European unification history, this approach helps to shed light on aspects of Euro-Arab relations in a period that followed the deadlock of the Euro-Arab dialogue but was yet far from the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In parallel, from an international history point of view, the period covers the Second Cold War and sees the rise of the concept of war against international terrorism. It is in this context that two case studies receive special attention: the Greek-Palestinian and the Greek-Libyan connection.
The Mediterranean in Andreas Papandreou's Foreign Policy Views
According to Papandreou's views, Greece was part of three circles: Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. These were the cores of his so-called "multidimensional policy", one that attached more importance to the North-South rather than to the East-West divide. 1 The term "Mediterranean" was systematically used to describe relations with "the Mediterranean people", especially "the Arab Nation", instead of the terms "Orient" and "Arab World" used by his (conservative) predecessors up until then. Greece's Arab policy traditionally took into consideration dependence on the Middle East oil provisions, the geographical proximity, the presence of Greek communities and economic activity of Greek nationals in the Arab countries, the existence of three orthodox Patriarchates (Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch). 2 The Cyprus affair and the need for Arab support in the international organizations were added to these factors from the fifties onwards. 3 What seemed new in Papandreou's views was his neutralist stance and the willingness to give substance to the idea of Greece being an integral part of the Mediterranean world, in the sense of being at once a European and a developing country, because of its troubled and rich in foreign interventions post-war history, perceived as unique for a NATO and EEC member state. Notwithstanding his dominant personality, Papandreou's neutralist stance was representative of the majority of the senior party members. 4 Papandreou's views on international relations and the place of Greece in the world were developed under the influence of his proper intellectual orientations and career in the USA, and his experience of the Greek political arena in the sixties. Through his studies, academic career and political action in the USA, where he lived for almost twenty years until 1959, Papandreou was linked to the liberal wing of the Democrats and to a network composed of influential personalities, such as the economists John Kenneth Galbraith and Carl Kaysen, who would later serve in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 5 During his brief political career in Greece after 1963, he was marked by the first Cyprus crisis in 1963-64 and witnessed the exercise of international politics in the Eastern Mediterranean from within, as he was present at the US-Greek contacts in Washington regarding the crisis containment. 6 As he admitted, the Cyprus crisis constituted his political awakening in international relations and forged his views on the exercise of foreign policy from the point of view of a small state. The military Junta of 1967-1974 further radicalised his political thinking. His book Paternalistic Capitalism, published in 1972, reflects his orientation from the orthodox economist he had been until then towards the dependency theory and more radical US intelligentsia such as neo-marxist economists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy or Richard J. Barnett, founder of the Institute for Policy Studies. 7 According to his academic colleagues, the book was mainly a political manifesto that reflected the author's own experiences and the perspective of a small state. 8 Indeed, Papandreou's ideas on international affairs were a mix of global conceptions nourished in the USA and his personal experiences at a local level.
One cannot consider the Mediterranean and Greece's place in it without encompassing the realities of the Greek-Turkish relationship and the problem of Cyprus, especially after the division of the island in 1974. The latter aspects, however, were distinctively considered as the Greek "national matters" in foreign affairs and defence, what has precisely been conceptualized as the core versus periphery policies.
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This article focuses on aspects of the periphery Mediterranean policies, though considering the connections with the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish relations, as well as the ways in which they formed part of the Greek-US relationship. Political Cooperation (EPC) decision on the proposed participation of the UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands in the multinational force of Sinai. 16 A compromise was found by issuing a two-fold declaration. A joint one considered the decision of the four as being in accordance with the wish of the EEC to facilitate a peace settlement in the Middle East, according to the rights of all states to existence and security and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. The second one was a common declaration between the four participating states, mentioning the Camp David Accords and the Venice Declaration.
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As for East-West relations, Greek views on Middle Eastern matters were expected to raise impediments to the adoption of common decisions because of PASOK's sympathy for the third world causes, including support for the PLO. However, Greek positions on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict were not that unique. In many ways, they were parallel to the Irish views and sometimes coincided with those of the French and the Italians. 18 27 At the same time, Greece engaged diplomatic activity in the EEC. On 7 June, the day following the launch of the Israeli operation, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked formally for an extraordinary EPC meeting to be held. Preliminary contacts were held at different levels (UN Representatives, Political Committee, Foreign Ministries' directors) and, on 9 June, the ten members of the EEC released a statement that condemned the invasion of Lebanon as a violation of international law and contrary to the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The statement expressed support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and called for respect of UN resolutions 508 and 509 regarding an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country and UNIFIL action. It finally reiterated the European position in favour of the establishment of a global peace in the region. 28 However, this common statement did not mean real convergence towards an active European approach. This became plainly evident when the Israeli operation extended beyond Southern Lebanon and France adopted a more active stance that failed to find European support. Mitterrand's first official declarations had remained balanced towards Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian action in Lebanon, but the siege of West Beirut after 13 June incited him to undertake an intense international activity in order to preserve the PLO as an interlocutor in any peace solution. Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO political section chief, was received in Paris where he met Premier Pierre Mauroy, Foreign Minister Cheysson and Secretary General of the Socialist Party Lionel Jospin. These contacts were part of the French activity in the UN, where concerted French-Egyptian action sought to amend the UN resolution 242 to also include the Palestinian national rights. Such French activity was opposed by the USA and found limited, if any, approved the Reagan Plan and also mentioned the Fez Statement as an expression of the will of its signatories, including the PLO, to work for peace in the Middle East. The statement's formulation was an outcome of Greek, Irish and French amendments of a project initially prepared by the Danish who held the EEC presidency at the time. The Greeks were eager that the Fez statement be underlined and so were the Irish, who wished to see a strong condemnation of the Israeli military occupation of West Beirut and an explicit mention of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The Irish argument was that the common European statement should take care to leave the door open to the future participation of the PLO in any peace negotiations, especially in the light of its withdrawal from Lebanon. French backing of these proposals allowed the adoption of the final text, not least because the widespread emotion the Sabra and Shatila massacres had an impact on the attitude of all the European partners.
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The Greek EEC Presidency, July-December 1983
The first Greek presidency of the EEC occurred in the second semester of 1983. It did not lead to any major evolution of the common European position regarding the Middle East matters. The EEC countries opted for a low profile during an international conference on the Palestinian question, held during the summer in Geneva, with Greece being the only member to fully participate. Also, Greece hosted a new session of the Euro-Arab Dialogue four years after its stalemate. However, this temporary reactivation bore no fruits, because it was clearly associated to political considerations regarding the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.
An international conference on Palestine was held from 29 August to 7 September 1983 at the UN Office at Geneva, following previous UN General Assembly resolutions voted in 1981 and 1982. 40 Initially, the conference was to be held at the headquarters of the UNESCO in Paris. But Mitterrand was not keen to host it on French soil and was able to obtain from the PLO that the conference be held in Geneva rather than in Paris. Mitterrand was under Israeli and US pressure, but his reluctance was also a sign of a less engaged policy towards Middle Eastern affairs and of his will to avoid further social tensions, as a result of the linking of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the anti-Semitic terrorist attack against the Goldenberg restaurant in Paris, in August 1982. 41 The Geneva declaration, issued at the end of the conference, reflected the will to give weight to the Fez Statement: a programme of action based on the Fez principles was proposed as a framework for convening a future international peace conference on the Middle East, bringing together all existing relevant UN resolutions, with a view to establish an independent Palestinian state.
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Of all the EEC countries Greece was the only one to participate as a full member at the conference, the rest of them assisting as observers. Although the Greek delegation expressed its full support to the conference's goals, it also distanced itself from all provisions that could harm its bilateral relations with Israel as incompatible with the common economic and trade policies of the EEC. Greece also defended the EEC, who was criticized as not having welcomed "all initiatives based on the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people", essentially the Fez plan, by reminding the conference of all the relevant European declarations. Greece's full participation in the conference showed the high price Papandreou continued to put on relations with the Arab and non-aligned countries, especially at the UN. But it also highlighted the inability of Greece to influence its European partners and to fulfil a much sought after role of bridge between Europe and the Arab states.
This was further shown during the short-lived revival of the EuroArab Dialogue (EAD) in December of the same year. A combined result of the need to launch a global approach towards the Mediterranean countries and of the oil crisis of 1973, the establishment of the EAD was clearly seen from a political point of view by both sides from the beginning. For the EEC, it was part of the first attempts to develop the EPC. For the Arab League, it was also a means of de facto normalization of the PLO status in the international arena. However, the European tendency to precisely depoliticize the procedure and concentrate on the economic aspects, and the impact of the Camp David accords, led the EAD to a stalemate after 1979. 43 The Lebanon War brought the subject back to the agenda as it was during the Summit of Fez that the Arab states agreed to try to reactivate the EAD procedure. In November 1982, contacts were held in Tunis between the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Embassy of Denmark (the country that held the EEC presidency in the second semester of 1982). The matter was handed to the German presidency in the first semester of 1983 but the Arab side delayed the process. Given the previous eagerness of the Arab League, it is probable that the delay was due to political 42 United Nations Information System on the Question calculations, as Greece was the next country to take over the EEC presidency. 44 Further preparation work was undertaken by the European Coordination Group at the end of spring and was intensified in September in Athens, as the Political Committee of 11-12 July had decided that the meeting of the general commission of the EAD would be held in the Greek capital. Since the first contacts taken between the EEC and the Arab League, it was clear that the political aspects would be brought up during the dialogue next to the economic and cultural ones. The question was whether these aspects would dominate the agenda. On the one hand, the European Coordination Group wanted to fix a framework in order to contain the political side of the EAD. On the other hand, the Arab proposals wanted to bring the Europeans closer to the positions of the Fez Plan or, at least, have them publicly adopt a more independent stance vis-à-vis the Reagan Plan. Clearly, the reactivation of the EAD was associated to the search for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, it was out of the order of the day to fundamentally modify the European position and even the explicit reiteration of the Venice Declaration -as proposed by Greece in an effort of compromise -was excluded, in order to avoid giving the EAD the aspect of a parallel negotiation forum. 45 Before the Athens European Council of 4-6 December 1983, most countries seemed to agree on the need to make a declaration on the Middle East, but no final consensus was reached. Greece proposed to revive the effort of a global approach for the Middle East by combining the Reagan and Fez plans. The UK, on the other hand, proposed a general statement of principles in order to reassure the Arab countries that Europe had actually a role to play, to define clearly the European objectives regarding Lebanon (phased withdrawal of all foreign military forces including the MNF within a given period, national reconciliation, UNIFIL action) and to provide for further diplomatic activity in accordance with the Reagan Plan. Ireland and Italy essentially agreed with the British proposals. The FRG, on the contrary, was in favour of a more reserved statement. Finally, France proposed a global European-led approach, in the spirit of the conclusions of the Solemn Declaration of the European Union of 19 June 1983 in favour of the reinforcement of the EPC, and in accordance with previous French action in the UN. 46 In the end, the Athens European
Council did not produce a common statement due to complete disagreement on the proposed reforms of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and to common financing mechanisms. 47 Not surprisingly, it avoided any discussion of major international matters, something that reportedly disappointed Papandreou, who also sought a strong declaration against Turkey and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus.
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Against this background, the 5 th General Commission of the EAD took place in Athens on 14 December 1983. The meeting focused on future perspectives and a possible re-launch of the dialogue, but no essential progress was made. After the discussions were concluded, the EEC presidency issued a neutral statement referring to the utility of the exchanges and the agreement of both sides about the future continuation of the dialogue. No joint statement was issued though because no common ground was found regarding the political aspects of the EAD. Further technical contacts continued throughout 1984 but the pattern remained the same, with the Arab League trying to obtain some kind of political declaration on the Middle East on behalf of the EEC and the latter avoiding it. Eventually, any reference to the designation of such a mission was deleted from the final EPC texts. The common statement released after the European Council of Dublin reaffirmed the previous official positions of the EEC in a generic way and without explicitly mentioning the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and independence. No special role for the EEC was evoked, as had been the case in the Venice Declaration. 53 As such, the Dublin statement remained within a perimeter defined by the Reagan Plan and showed that no particular European initiative was on the agenda. This was the line followed in 1985 by the Italian presidency. The Craxi-Mitterrand correspondence shows that they both agreed on the necessity for the EEC to keep itself limited to the exchange of views between its members within the framework of the EPC and to encourage a common Jordanian-Palestinian approach that was in progress after the meeting of the Palestine National Council in Amman in November 1984. 54 Following the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement of February 1985, the EPC meeting of 29 April 1985 in Luxembourg led to a statement expressing satisfaction and reaffirming that the EEC was willing to contribute to such a process on the basis of the principles previously expressed in the EEC statements regarding the right of all states to exist, Israel included, and the need to associate the PLO in any negotiations. In this context, Greece was too small a player to play a leading role, though the country followed closely all the relevant European activities in the Middle East countries which in any case had considerably slowed down. From a certain point of view, encouraged as they were by the Cypriots, Papandreou's contacts with Libya continued a tradition of relations with the non-alignment movement that Archbishop Makarios had established as a means of protection against Turkey, now placed at the level of a regional EuroMediterranean network where the Greek Socialists tried to gain influence and in which neither Turkish nor Israeli political formations participated. Libya was the party's privileged interlocutor in North Africa. The country seemed attractive at the time because of its socialist-inspired economic model but these perceptions were to change after 1981 when the Libyans would be severely judged as unreliable economic partners. Post-"Arab Spring" perceptions make past contacts with Arab dictators appear, to say the very least, as sins of youth for the European leaders. However, such contacts were also part of a larger Euro-Mediterranean network in which many European Socialists, who would come to power in the eighties and would later be present at the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, participated.
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To Libya, the network of the Mediterranean socialist parties represented a certain domain of international activity. Marginalised in the inter-Arab scene, out of rivalry with Egypt and Syria, and on bad terms with the US, Gaddafi's alternatives consisted in developing careful relations with the USSR and being active in three international domains: the Mediterranean region, Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where he mainly backed dissident Palestinian formations that opposed Arafat, essentially the Abu Nidal Organization. 59 From this point of view, Papandreou's election in 1981 provided Gaddafi with a much needed potential connexion to the EEC, other than the important bilateral economic ties he held mainly with Germany, Italy and France.
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Manos Kafetzopoulos, who was not a diplomat but a party member, was appointed Ambassador in Tripoli. This was a sign of the importance Papandreou attached to the Greek-Libyan relationship. But it also highlighted his distrust of the Greek diplomatic corps that often served independently of the regime's change after 1974, as the previous Greek Ambassador in Libya had been appointed by the Colonels' Junta. Kafetzopoulos was acquainted with Ahmad Shahati, chief of the Libyan Foreign Affairs Office, in the seventies, in the framework of the Mediterranean socialist conferences, but also with the Fatah section that was based in Tripoli, which made him a well-recognized actor in the bilateral relation between Tripoli and Athens. As Ambassador, he had liberty in his initiatives and direct communication with Papandreou.
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Right after Papandreou's election, Colonel Gaddafi seemed eager to visit Athens but the idea was entirely opposed by the Greek President Karamanlis, who was cautious to preserve Greece's relations with the USA. According to Kafetzopoulos, Papandreou was not willing to harm his relations with Karamanlis over this. So, perhaps conveniently, Gaddafi's visit in Athens was soon off the agenda. Greek-Libyan economic relations paid the price, as oil exports to Greece and payments to construction companies active in Libya (a total of 120 million dollars) ceased. However, things had returned to normal by June 1982. 63 It is not clear what made Gaddafi change his attitude, but this was probably due to Greece's activity over the Lebanon War and its links to France. Greece seemed then potentially useful in two domains that were crucial to Libya, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Africa. Gaddafi had every reason to be on good terms with Papandreou, especially since the latter was not an enemy for him. The French-Libyan relations were strained at the time because of Libya's support to the opponents of the legal government of Chad that was backed by France. According to former Foreign Minister of France, Roland Dumas, Andreas Papandreou was one of the intermediaries Gaddafi used during this period to declare himself disposed to come to terms with the French regarding Chad, the other one being Bruno Kreisky. For Greece, except for their economic aspects, the importance of relations with Libyaand the Arab countries in general -was further underlined after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 15 November 1983 and its search for international recognition. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 541, the Arab states declared themselves to be opposed to the self-proclamation of the TRNC and did not grant it diplomatic recognition nor upgraded the observer status the Cypriot-Turkish community held in the Organization of the Islamic Conference to full membership. The meeting between Mitterrand and Gaddafi took place at Elounda, Crete, on 15 November 1984. Elounda was a convenient choice, as neither Mitterrand nor Karamanlis wished to have Gaddafi officially invited in their respective capitals. There is no official account of the meeting, but according to the Greek and French press the negotiations were lengthy and laborious. 70 The Libyan forces were still in Chad, whereas the French had already ordered the retreat of theirs (operation Manta) before the agreed deadline, which was precisely the 15 November. The French had been publicly humiliated by US revelations on the Libyan inconsistency just days after a joint communiqué had simultaneously been released by the French and the Libyan Foreign Ministries. The Chad affair did not find a solution until two years later, but, at the time, Andreas Papandreou was able to reinforce his image as a promoter of peace in the Mediterranean and as a mediator between the West and Gaddafi, as he had previously obtained the release of French (1983) and British (1984) nationals that were detained in Libya. The Elounda meeting also coincided with the decision of the Greek government to buy 40 French Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft, as part of the Greek air forces' modernization programme, decreasing by half an initial order that provided for the purchase of 80 F-16s from the USA.
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The dissolution of the Greek-Libyan connexion, [1985] [1986] The foundations of the Greek-Libyan relationship were fragile and this soon became plainly evident. In 1985, the Reagan administration adopted a tougher stance towards international terrorism emanating from the Middle East. 72 In Greece, Karamanlis, whom the US trusted, was no longer President, after Papandreou backed Christos Sartzetakis in the presidential election of March 1985. As a consequence, direct US pressure on the Greek government regarding its relations with Gaddafi became stronger. For example, Washington made use of the threat to cancel the delivery of the 40 F-16 aircraft, something that would affect the military balance between Greece and Turkey. In June, following the hi-jack of the TWA 847 Athens to Rome flight by two members of Hezbollah, the State Department issued an instruction against travel via Athens airport. The warning stayed valid for only a month but it was effective, as companies such as Pan-American Airways went so far as to temporarily suspend all flights to and from Athens. 73 equipment they were given. By April 1986, the security of Athens airport had considerably improved. 75 At the same time, relations with Libya took a different turn: by March 1986, the decision was taken to replace Kafetzopoulos, who would join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as advisor for Arab Affairs, with Vanghelis Hatzimanolis, an economist and member of PASOK's committee of foreign relations. 76 The aim was to push for implementation of the 1984 accords and apparently Greece attached more importance to the development of the economic aspects of its relations with Libya. Undoubtedly, these were also signs that the Greek government was careful to preserve its relations with the USA. In 1986, Greek-Libyan relations were further depoliticized under the influence of the crisis between Gaddafi and the USA and the readjustment of Greek-US relations. In late March, tension between the Libyans and the Americans during a US naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra escalated to limited military actions. At the time, Secretary of State George Shultz was in Athens (25-27 March) for discussions on the future of the US bases in Greece and Greek-US relations, with Libya also being part of the agenda. Official Greek reaction to the events was cautious and balanced and showed no support for Libyan claims in the Gulf of Sidra. The US operation was condemned by the PASOK's committee for foreign relations, but the party abstained from the anti-US demonstrations that were organized in the Greek capital. 77 The terrorist attack on the discotheque "La Belle" in West Berlin, on 6 April, for which the US -rightly, as was later proved -blamed Gaddafi, led to the launch of a series of US air strikes against Libya. The EEC countries, with the exception of the UK, did not allow to use their military bases in the operation against Libya. Under US pressure, they denounced Libyan involvement in terrorism and agreed to restrict freedom of movement for the country's diplomatic staff in European capitals, but did not take any economic measures against Tripoli. 78 In a speech in the Greek Parliament, Papandreou criticized the US action but, in general, Greece's attitude was along the same lines as that of all the EEC countries without trying to go it alone. humanitarian, by hosting Libyan children in Greece, including Gaddafi's children; and even military, by totally forbidding the use of the US bases in Greece even for interception purposes. 80 Gaddafi himself confirmed several years later that he had considered launching missile attacks against the US bases on Crete. The fact was that the April USLibyan crisis revealed a total change in the Greek government's attitude towards Gaddafi. In July 1986, following the EEC decisions and a Greek-Libyan agreement, the Libyan Popular Office of Athens reduced its staff. 81 
Network visualization of the main terrorist organizations that perpetrated attacks in

Conclusion
Greece's attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the framework of the EPC from 1981 to 1985 was a conjunction of Realpolitik concerns, ideology and even emotional attachment to the Palestinian cause. Indeed, relevant Greek action in the EEC offers an interesting insight to the connections between foreign policy and emotional attitudes inspired by a nation's own history, collective memory and even nationalism. In particular, different European attitudes during the 1982 Lebanon War show that emotions can be a driving force in rational decision making on foreign affairs matters when Realpolitik concerns and the balance of power in a collective framework, in this case the EPC, allow it. 82 Greece's energy also shows that the country was quick to adapt to the EEC foreign-policy making mechanisms and to contribute to decision-making through collaboration with its partners soon after fully joining the Community. Greece was able to profit from European attitudes when these fitted its general goals and appear as a positive and effective player in the Mediterranean. However, there were limits and they became evident when bigger players that led the gameFrance or Italy -did not leave Greece enough space or, indeed, when Greek positions were out of time.
The case of Libya, on the other hand, shows a quick Westernisation of Greece's policy towards this country under the combined influence of three factors: US pressure on Greece, Libyan backed terrorism and the liberalisation of European and third world economies that favoured developing economic rather than political relations with Libya. In 1986, from all aspects, Greece's attitude was entirely part of a multilateral EEC approach towards the US-Libyan crisis, formalised or not, and was even claimed as such. The personal policy that Papandreou had followed up until then, in part out of domestic concerns and in part because of the nature of the relations one could have with Gaddafi, who totally dominated the exercise of Libyan foreign policy, seemed completely outdated once terrorism entered the agenda of international relations. The Papandreou-Gaddafi relationship reveals an interesting aspect of socialisation between Mediterranean leaders that developed also in the name of an updated third-worldism during the Second Cold War, only to vanish under the impact of the different evolution the Mediterranean North and South and the coming dissolution of the bipolar world.
Last but not least, the shadow of the Cyprus affair and the GreekTurkish relations, that one finds constantly behind Greece's Arab policy and PASOK's third road approach, would in their turn be Europeanised, in the sense of a more denationalised and multilateral approach, with the adoption of a positive Greek attitude towards Turkey's EU candidature at the 1999 Helsinki Council and Cyprus's accession to the EU in 2004. 83 These policies were principally led or backed by post-Papandreou socialist governments. However, the reorientation towards a European option for Cyprus appeared already on the horizon in the mid-eighties, as the dissolution of Cold War balances was coming into the picture, rendering its foreign policy's third world orientations outdated. 84 In conclusion, Papandreou's tentative of exercising a multidimensional foreign policy during this period shows how fluid a concept the Mediterranean eventually remained when faced with Realpolitik and domestic concerns, continuous conflict and lack of a common European foreign policy.
